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ABSTRACT
Analyzing a new dataset of 110,000 consumer complaints lodged
with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the “CFPB” or the
“Bureau”), the authors find that: (i) Bank of America, Citibank, and
PNC Bank were significantly less timely in responding to consumer
complaints than the average financial institution; (ii) consumers of
some of the largest financial services providers, including Wells
Fargo, American Express (“Amex”), and Bank of America, were
significantly more likely than the average consumer to dispute the
provider’s response to their initial complaints; and (iii) among the
companies included in the database that provide mortgages,
OneWest Bank, HSBC, Nationstar Mortgage, and Bank of America
all received more mortgage complaints relative to mortgages sold
than other mortgage providers. In addition, regression analysis
suggests that consumer financial companies respond differently to
complaints, depending on the type of product and issues involved,
thereby generating significant differences in the timeliness of
responses and whether consumers dispute those responses.
Moreover, demographics matter: mortgage complaints per mortgage
significantly increased in ZIP codes with larger proportions of
certain populations, including Blacks and Hispanics. Companies
were also less timely, and more likely to have their responses
disputed, in areas with higher concentrations of senior citizens and
college students, groups on which the CFPB is mandated to focus.

* Participants in Yale Law School’s Empirical Law and Economics seminar and Nancy
Welsh provided helpful comments. Ian Ayres has served as an economic expert for
proposed plaintiff classes in several cases relating in part to alleged untimely decisionmaking regarding permanent mortgage modifications under the Home Affordable
Mortgage Program.
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INTRODUCTION
Since its inception in 2011, the CFPB has enabled consumers to
submit complaints about “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices”
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by financial services companies. The purpose of this complaint process,
required under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act1 (“Dodd-Frank”) is threefold: (1) to assist individual
consumers with specific complaints; (2) to focus the Bureau’s
enforcement and regulatory efforts on specific companies and general
“business practices that may pose risks to consumers” based on
aggregate consumer concerns; and (3) by making the data publicly
available, to provide the financial services industry with a high-level
view of what matters to consumers and to provide consumers with a
view into how companies are meeting those needs.2 The raw complaint
data is updated nightly and available to download from the Bureau’s
website.3 Although the CFPB analyzes some of the data internally for
its semiannual reports to Congress, the Bureau encourages “the public,
including consumers, the companies that serve them, analysts, data
scientists, civic hackers, developers, policymakers, journalists, and
academics, to analyze, augment, and build on the public database” as
well.4
The analysis that follows is in keeping with that request. The
authors of this Article have assessed the approximately 110,000
complaints included in the CFPB’s Consumer Complaint Database (the
“Database”) as of June 3, 2013. The results indicate that in the
aggregate, these complaints provide a veritable treasure trove of data for
assessing the work of the Bureau and the companies under its watch.
The authors analyzed the complaints in three key ways. First, they
looked at the data by company to analyze differences in performance on
the percentage of company responses disputed by customers, the
percentage of company responses that the CFPB did not receive in a
timely manner, and for mortgages specifically, the number of
complaints relative to products sold. The authors found that Bank of
America, Citibank, and PNC Bank were all significantly less timely in
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
2. See Submit a Complaint, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/.
3. See Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaintdatabase/.
4. Richard Cordray, Director of the Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Remarks at the
Consumer Response Field Hearing (Mar. 28, 2013), available at
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/speeches/prepared-remarks-of-director-richardcordray-at-the-consumer-response-field-hearing/ [hereinafter Cordray, Field Hearing
Prepared Remarks].
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responding to complaints than the average financial institution.
Additionally, consumers of some of the largest financial services
providers, including Wells Fargo, Amex, and Bank of America, were
significantly more likely than the average consumer to dispute the
company’s response. Among companies that provide mortgages,
OneWest Bank, HSBC, Nationstar Mortgage, and Bank of America all
generated more mortgage complaints relative to mortgages sold than
other banks. These results should be of interest to both the CFPB and
the companies named above.
Second, the authors’ analysis examined differences between
products and the specific issues about which consumers complained.
Financial institutions were significantly less timely in responding to
complaints concerning identity theft, fraud, or embezzlement, compared
to credit card interest rate complaints (the credit card issue with the most
complaints), while bank account and credit card complaints were more
likely to receive a timely response relative to mortgage complaints (the
product category with the most complaints). Similarly, bank account,
credit card, and student loan consumers were less likely to dispute the
company’s response to their complaints, compared to mortgage
complaints.
However, those who complained specifically about
bankruptcy issues related to credit cards, credit card cash advances,
collection of debt disputes, and credit reporting (either to a credit card
company or credit reporting agency) were significantly more likely to
dispute the company’s response, relative to other issues concerning the
same products.
Third, the authors of this Article also regressed the complaint data
on a number of regional demographic factors by ZIP code or ZIP Code
Tabulation Area (“ZCTA”)5 in order to assess the likelihood of certain
populations availing themselves of the CFPB’s complaints process in
the first place. Once the consumer made a complaint, the authors also
assessed how likely companies were to respond in a timely fashion and
how likely those consumers were to dispute the response. Across a
variety of specifications (controlling for time, company, product, issue,

5. ZIP Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs) are generalized areal representations of
U.S. Postal Service ZIP Code service areas. ZIP codes, by contrast, are a collection of
mail delivery routes. In most instances, ZIP codes and ZCTAs are identical, although
that is not always the case. See generally ZIP Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs), U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/zctas.html (last revised June 20,
2013).
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and state fixed effects), the authors found statistically significant
increases in complaints per mortgage in ZIP codes with larger
residential proportions of Black, Hispanic, senior citizens (those over 65
years of age), and high school and college graduates. In analogous
regressions for the likelihood that company responses were untimely or
disputed, a number of these demographic factors were likewise
significant, including the proportion of senior citizens and the
percentage of college enrollees. By virtue of the mandates built into
Dodd-Frank, these subgroups are of particular interest to the Bureau, as
discussed below.
Part I of this Article provides the general background of the CFPB.
Part II describes the process by which consumers can lodge complaints
with the CFPB and details the history and structure of the Consumer
Complaint Database. Part III explains the empirical methodology and
summary statistics for the complaints in the Database. Part IV presents
the results of the analysis. Part V considers the implications of these
findings for the CFPB and the financial services companies that it
regulates.
I. THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU
Title X of Dodd-Frank established the CFPB as the independent
executive agency responsible for regulating “the offering and provision
of consumer financial products or services under the Federal consumer
financial laws.”6 The mission of the Bureau is to “make markets for
consumer financial products and services work for Americans—whether
they are applying for a mortgage, choosing among credit cards, or using
any number of other consumer financial products.”7 The CFPB operates
on a budget of $541 million annually, about 10% of which is allocated
to consumer response operations, e.g., the formal complaints process.8
In addition to assisting consumers with specific complaints and
aggregating complaint data, the CFPB also works to educate consumers,
6. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (2012). As a note, the agency is not “independent” in
certain respects, i.e., it is housed for budgetary purposes in the Federal Reserve. See
infra note 26 and accompanying text.
7. About Us, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Dec. 10, 2013),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ [hereinafter CFPB, About Us].
8. The CFPB Strategic Plan, Budget, and Performance Plan and Report,
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Apr. 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
strategic-plan-budget-and-performance-plan-and-report/#budget-overview [hereinafter
CFPB, Strategic Plan].
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research consumer behavior, supervise financial companies with over
$10 billion in assets, and enforce federal consumer financial protection
laws.9
The concept of a federal consumer financial protection agency
dates back to a 2007 essay by then-Harvard Law Professor Elizabeth
Warren in the summer edition of the Democracy journal.10 Warren’s
“Unsafe at Any Rate” intentionally echoed Ralph Nader’s 1965 “Unsafe
at Any Speed,” which detailed the dangers of an unregulated automotive
industry.11 She decried the “tattered patchwork” of oversight over
financial products and services.12 In contrast to consumer products,
which were subject to “basic safety regulations well in advance of
reaching store shelves,” Warren argued that overlapping state and
federal regulatory regimes enabled financial services companies to
“trick” and “trap” unwary consumers.13 Warren called for a Financial
Product Safety Commission to be modeled after the U.S. Consumer
Product Safety Commission of the 1970s with the mission “to establish
guidelines for consumer disclosures, collect and report data about the
uses of different financial products, review new financial products for
safety, and require modification of dangerous products before they can
be marketed to the public.”14
President Barak Obama, after his first presidential election,
incorporated elements of Warren’s plan into his economic agenda.15 In
April of 2009, the White House’s chief economic adviser, Lawrence
Summers, met with his former Harvard colleague, Elizabeth Warren,
apparently to discuss the design of a new regulatory agency.16 Around
the same time, President Obama publicly supported the Consumer
Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, proposed as a stand-alone bill
in April 2009 by Senators Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) and Charles Schumer (D-

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See CFPB, About Us, supra note 7.
See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe At Any Rate, DEMOCRACY, Summer 2007, at 8.
See RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965).
See Warren, supra note 10, at 9.
See id. at 9–11.
See id. at 17.
Administration Said to Eye New Finance Regulatory Panel, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (May 20, 2009), http://nyti.ms/1eFZKdh.
16. See Damian Paletta, Fight Over Consumer Agency Looms as Overhaul Is
Signed, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748
704746804575367502836650966.html.
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N.Y.) in the Senate17 and Representatives Brad Miller (D-Calif.) and
Bill Delahunt (D-Mass.) in the House.18 President Obama used the same
analogy in promoting the idea as Warren had in her 2007 article:
[w]hen you buy a toaster, if it explodes in your face, there’s a law
that says your toasters need to be safe. But when you get a credit
card or a mortgage, there’s no law on the books that says if that
explodes in your face financially, somehow you’re going to be
19
protected.

In June of 2009, the Treasury Department under President Obama
included a proposal for a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency
(the “CFPA”) in his comprehensive financial regulatory reform plan, “A
New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation.”20
In keeping with Warren’s original paper, the report argued that the
CFPA was needed to “protect consumers and investors from financial
abuse.”21 In particular, the goal of the agency was to “reduce gaps in
federal supervision and enforcement; improve coordination with the
states; set higher standards for financial intermediaries; and promote
consistent regulation of similar products.”22 Although financial industry
executives heavily lobbied against the creation of a new regulatory
body, the idea attracted legislative interest.23 Representative Barney
Frank, an early supporter, helped shepherd the financial reform bill
17.
18.

Financial Product Safety Commission Act of 2009, S. 566, 111th Cong. (2009).
Financial Product Safety Commission Act of 2009, H.R. 1705, 111th Cong.
(2009). Representative Delahunt and Senator Durbin had previously sponsored the
similar Consumer Credit Safety Commission Act of 2008 in the House and Senate,
respectively; neither bill made it out of committee. See Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321 (2013).
19. Ryan Grim, Obama Backs Financial Product Safety Commission Concept,
HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 20, 2009, www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/20/obama-backsfinancial-pro_n_177433.html.
20. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL
SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, available at www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/
FinalReport_web.pdf [hereinafter A NEW FOUNDATION].
21. See id. at 55.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION AGENCY ACT (H.R. 3126): THE WRONG APPROACH TO STRONGER
CONSUMER PROTECTION (July 2009), available at http://www.aba.com/Press/
Documents/fc4d91913d034b199f17ecb7b6cc2c21ConsumerAgencyWrongApproachO
nePager071709.pdf; Edmund L. Andrews, Banks Balk at Agency Meant to Aid
Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/01/
business/economy/01regulate.html; Paletta, supra note 16.
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through the House with the agency provision intact, albeit with some
modifications to garner Republican support and enable passage.24 In the
Senate, Senator Christopher Dodd’s financial reform plan also included
provisions for the creation of a new agency.25 In contrast to the Obama
and House plans, however, Senator Dodd’s version was called the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and pursuant to a legislative
compromise with Senator Bob Corker, Senator Dodd proposed that it be
housed within the Federal Reserve.26 The final version of the bill
retained both of these changes and was signed into law by President
Obama on July 21, 2010.27 The CFPB officially opened one year later
on July 21, 2011 with Richard Cordray as acting director.28
II. THE CFPB’S COMPLAINTS PROCESS
The responsibility for receiving, settling, and aggregating
individual consumer complaints seems to have been contemplated as
part of the CFPB’s ambit from the beginning. Although Professor
Warren’s 2007 article does not specifically advocate for a formal
24. House modifications from the original Obama proposal included: oversight by
one director, rather than a four-member board; exemptions for community banks; and
the loss of a planned requirement to have companies offer simpler (“plain vanilla”)
versions of particular products. See, e.g., DAVID H. CARPENTER & MARK JICKLING,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40696, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: ANALYSIS OF THE
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGENCY (CFPA) AS PROPOSED BY THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION AND H.R. 3126 (2009), available at assets.opencrs.com/rpts/
R40696_20091109.pdf; Paletta, supra note 16; David Stout & Stephen Labaton, Vote
Backs a Financial Oversight Body, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2009,
www.nytimes.com/2009/10/23/business/23regs.html?ref=consumerfinancialprotectionb
ureau.
25. Arthur Delaney & Shahien Nasiripour, Dodd Unveils Financial Regulatory
Reform Bill With ‘Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,’ HUFFINGTON POST, June
17, 2010, www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/15/dodd-unveils-financial-re_n_499569.
26. Id.
27. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
28. The political battle over leadership of the agency is beyond the scope of this
paper. See, e.g., Suzanna Andrews, The Woman Who Knew Too Much, VANITY FAIR,
Nov. 2011, www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2011/11/elizabeth-warren-201111. A
letter dated May 2, 2011, signed by 44 Republican senators who refused to confirm any
CFPB director without “reforms” in the Bureau’s structure, is available online. Letter
from Republican Senators, to Barrack Obama, President (May 2, 2011), available at
www.aba.com/aba/documents/blogs/doddfrank/SenateToObamaCFPBApril2011.pdf.
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complaint process, maintaining a publicly available consumer product
database that contains individual consumer complaints was an integral
function of the Consumer Product Safety Commission that she used as
her model.29 Every one of the pre-Dodd-Frank iterations of legislation
to create a consumer financial agency had specifically vested it with the
responsibility of receiving and resolving individual consumer
complaints related to financial products and services.30 For example,
one of the main objectives of the Commission created by the Consumer
Credit Safety Commission Act of 2008 was to “collect, investigate,
resolve, and inform the public about consumer complaints regarding
consumer credit,” including by creating a consumer credit customer
hotline.31 Both the Senate and House versions of the Financial Product
Safety Commission Act of 2009 used similar language to describe the
complaints process to be included within the new agency’s purview.32
Likewise, in explaining his 2009 “New Foundation” plan, President
Obama claimed that to achieve its goals, the CFPA “should have a wide
variety of tools” at its disposal, including authority for “collecting and
tracking complaints about consumer financial services and facilitating
complaint resolution with respect to federally-supervised institutions.”33
Dodd-Frank preserves the consumer financial complaint process as one
of the CFPB’s core functions:34
The Director shall establish a unit whose functions shall include
establishing a single, toll-free telephone number, a website, and a
database or utilizing an existing database to facilitate the centralized
collection of, monitoring of, and response to consumer complaints
35
regarding consumer financial products or services.

29. See Warren, supra note 10; see also Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2051–2089 (2012).
30. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Safety Commission Act, S. 3629, 110th Cong.
(2008), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/s3629/text. The House
version (H.R. 7258) was identical; see Consumer Credit Safety Commission Act, H.R.
7258, 110th Cong. (2008); see also supra notes 17 and 18.
31. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Safety Commission Act, S. 3629, 110th Cong.
(2008), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/s3629/text; Consumer
Credit Safety Commission Act, H.R. 7258, 110th Cong. (2008).
32. See supra notes 17 and 18.
33. See A NEW FOUNDATION, supra note 20, at 62.
34. See 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(3)(A) (2012).
35. Id.
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In addition to maintaining the complaint collection process, DoddFrank also requires the Bureau to provide an analysis of all of the
complaints received in the Bureau’s semiannual report to Congress.36
Furthermore, the CFPB must provide a “timely response” to any
consumer complaint, and companies subject to the Bureau’s jurisdiction
are likewise required to respond in a “timely” fashion to the Bureau.37
The CFPB’s complaints process, including the resulting data and
analysis, is pivotal to the agency’s work in three ways.38 First, it enables
the Bureau to assist individual consumers with specific complaints
through one unified regulatory interface.39 Second, it provides the
Bureau with relevant data for performing the investigative and
regulatory functions.40 Third, it provides a snapshot into consumers’
issues and the financial companies that serve those consumers.41
The need to streamline consumer complaints and questions about
consumer financial products was, apparently, neither a new42 nor a
partisan concern.43 Since 2006, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (“OCC”) began collaborating with state banking departments
to share complaint data on a state-by-state basis.44 Republicanappointed Comptroller John C. Dugan noted in a January 2007 speech
that his office received “numerous inquiries and complaints from
consumers of institutions that [the Comptroller] do[es]n’t regulate, and
the same is true for our sister agencies at the federal and state level. . . .
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See 12 U.S.C. § 5496(c)(4) (2012).
See 12 U.S.C. § 5534(a) (2012).
See Cordray, Field Hearing Prepared Remarks, supra note 4.
See id.
Id.
Id.
For example, Comptroller John C. Dugan raised these concerns as early as
2006, before the financial crisis. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, OCC, CSBS Agree on Consumer Complaint Information-Sharing Plan
(Nov. 20, 2006), available at www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2006/nr-ia2006-126.html [hereinafter OCC, 11/20/2006 Press Release].
43. Although the legislation creating the CFPB was passed by a Democratic
legislature and signed by a Democratic president, the OCC under Republican President
Bush initially promoted the efforts to streamline consumer complaints. See John C.
Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the Exchequer Club and Women
in Housing and Finance 20 (Jan. 17, 2007), available at www.occ.gov/newsissuances/speeches/2007/pub-speech-2007-4.pdf [hereinafter Dugan, 01/17/2007
Remarks].
44. OCC, 11/20/2006 Press Release, supra note 42.

2014]

SKELETONS IN THE DATABASE

353

Unfortunately, that process takes time; is sometimes constrained by
customer privacy restrictions; and has afforded few systematic
opportunities to follow up on the disposition of complaints that have
been referred.”45 As a potential result of the OCC’s focus on reducing
consumer confusion, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council agreed in September 2007 to establish an inter-agency working
group “to identify best practices related to the banking agencies’
consumer complaint process.”46 These steps were far removed from full
agency integration, though. For example, one of Dugan’s suggestions to
the working group was a common interagency Web portal that would
route customers to the appropriate regulatory body.47
A similar desire for a common consumer interface motivated
Representative Carolyn Maloney (D-N.Y.) to introduce the Financial
Consumer Hotline Act of 2007. Representative Maloney’s bill was
designed to “establish a single, toll-free telephone number consumers
can call if they have a question or complaint and want to speak to the
bank’s regulator.”48 Although the bill passed in the House by a large
margin, it died in the Senate.49
Consumers’ confusion prior to the creation of the CFPB was not
surprising: there were at least 12 federal agencies with some,
occasionally overlapping, responsibility for consumer financial
protection, in addition to state attorneys general and banking
regulators.50 For example, a consumer with a complaint about a national

45.
46.

Dugan, 01/17/2007 Remarks, supra note 43, at 20.
FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT 2007 4 (2007),
available at www.ffiec.gov/PDF/annrpt07.pdf.
47. See Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Comptroller
Dugan Tells Conference that Consumers Will Benefit From More Unified Interagency
Approach to Complaint Handling (Oct. 15, 2007), available at www.occ.gov/newsissuances/news-releases/2007/nr-occ-2007-111.html.
48. Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney of New York, Speech in the House of
Representatives (Mar. 12, 2009), available at thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/
D?r111:1./temp/_r111qX5HaL.
49. The bill passed 408-1 in the House. See H.R. 4332, 110th Cong. (2007),
available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr4332. However, in the
Senate, the Financial Consumer Hotline Act never moved past the committee stage. See
S. 3153, 110th Cong. (2008), available at www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/s3153.
50. These 12 agencies were: OCC, Office of Thrift Supervision, National Credit
Union Administration, Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Federal Housing Finance Agency, Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Veterans Administration (for VA-guaranteed mortgage loans), Internal Revenue
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bank would have needed to contact the OCC while a complaint about a
state-chartered member bank would have needed to go to the bank’s
primary federal supervisor (either the Federal Reserve or the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation) or state regulators.51 If the complaint
dealt with a mortgage, however, it would have had to be routed to the
Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, or the Veterans Administration, depending on the
type of loan.52 As a result, the OCC alone reported that it both received
11,000 misdirected complaints from other agencies and referred an
additional 10,000 misdirected complaints to other agencies—out of the
70,000 annual complaints opened in 2007.53
In addition to providing consumers with one interagency regulatory
interface, the data garnered through the complaints process provides
input into the CFPB’s enforcement arm, both on an individual level and
in the aggregate. According to the CFPB Supervision and Examination
Manual, which provides guidance to examiners in overseeing consumer
finance companies, the complaint data helps to determine which
companies should be subjected to an examination.54
In undertaking a Risk Assessment, examiners should consider both
the volume and the nature of consumer complaints received by the
entity or by regulatory bodies including the CFPB. In addition to
shedding important light on the extent and types of concerns of
consumers utilizing the entity’s consumer financial products or
services, complaints may provide indications of potential regulatory
violations, including unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices

Service, Federal Trade Commission, Department of Defense (for payday lending to
military members), and Department of Justice. See Levitin, supra note 18, at 327–28.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. H.R. 4332, The Financial Consumer Hotline Act of 2007: Providing
Consumers with Easy Access to the Appropriate Banking Regulator Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th
Cong. 5 (2007) (statement of John G. Walsh, Chief of Staff and Public Affairs, Office
of
the
Comptroller
of
the
Currency),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg40436/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg40436.pdf.
54. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION
MANUAL 21 (2012), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_
cfpb_supervision-and-examination-manual-v2.pdf.
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(UDAAPs). How the entity handles complaints is also a key element
55
in evaluating its compliance management system.

If the CFPB’s Consumer Response unit deems that a company has
not sufficiently addressed an individual complaint, the unit can refer the
issue to the Division of Supervision, Enforcement, and Fair Lending and
Equal Opportunity “for further action.”56 Moreover, the Bureau claims
that the complaints that it receives also enable it to “write better rules
and regulations,” presumably by providing detailed information about
the practices perceived as consumer-unfriendly so that the Bureau could
target such practices with new guidelines.57
In keeping with the extensive debate over the CFPB’s creation, the
consumer complaints process has not escaped controversy, particularly
its third function: providing information to the public about financial
services practices. In 2012, financial services companies strenuously
objected to the CFPB’s proposed policy of including the name of the
company in the complaint in the publicly available database.58
According to the Bureau, disclosing the number and type of complaints
against individual companies was essential to providing transparency in
the marketplace, including the enabling of third-party sources to rate
companies on product performance and the services offered.59 By
contrast, the financial services industry worried that “the inclusion of
issuer identification will have serious adverse implications for
consumers and card issuers alike. . . . Most importantly, absent the
ability to verify and properly respond to consumer accusations, the

55.
56.

Id.
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 36 (2013), available at files.consumerfinance.gov/
f/201303_CFPB_SemiAnnualReport_March2013.pdf [hereinafter CFPB, SEMIANNUAL REPORT].
57. Id.
58. As a note, confidential identifying information about consumers is not included
in the Database. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau Launches Consumer Complaint Database (June 19, 2012), available at
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/consumer-financial-protection-bureaulaunches-consumer-complaint-database/. For a discussion of some of the controversy
surrounding the disclosure policy, see BUREAU OF CONSUMER FIN. PROT., DOCKET NO.
CFPB-2012-0023, DISCLOSURE OF CONSUMER COMPLAINT DATA 4–5 (2013), available
at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_Final-Policy-Statement-Disclosureof-Consumer-Complaint-Data.pdf [hereinafter CFPB, DISCLOSURE OF CONSUMER
COMPLAINT DATA].
59. Cordray, Field Hearing Prepared Remarks, supra note 4.
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inclusion of an issuer’s identity may cause unnecessary harm to the
reputation and the safety and soundness of that issuer.”60 After
receiving comments and weighing input from industry groups, consumer
advocacy organizations, and individual consumers, the CFPB officially
adopted its policy of disclosing company identity in March of 2013.61
On June 19, 2012, the Consumer Complaint Database officially opened
to the public.62
The Bureau began accepting consumer complaints on its first day
of operations in July 2011, albeit at first only those related to credit
cards.63 The Consumer Response division has since expanded to
complaints about: mortgages (on December 1, 2011); bank accounts and
services, private student loans, vehicle loans, and other consumer loans
(on March 1, 2012);64 credit reporting complaints (on October 22,
2012);65 and money transfers (on April 4, 2013).66 Since the Bureau
opened, it has received over 100,000 consumer complaints, 91,000 in
2012 alone.67 Consumers can submit complaints via the CFPB’s
website, telephone, mail, email, fax, or by referral to the agency from a
third party.68
The Bureau, upon receiving the complaint, must confirm that there
is a commercial relationship between the consumer and company, that
the complaint is not a duplicate, and that the complaint was submitted
by the identified consumer or his or her authorized representative.69
60. Letter from Consumer Bankers Ass’n, to the Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Jan.
30, 2012), available at http://www.cbanet.org/documents/CBA_Credit_Card_
Complaint_Data_Comment_Letter_01302012.pdf.
61. CFPB, DISCLOSURE OF CONSUMER COMPLAINT DATA, supra note 58.
62. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER RESPONSE: A SNAPSHOT OF
COMPLAINTS RECEIVED 2 (2012), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/
f/201210_cfpb_consumer_response_september-30-snapshot.pdf [hereinafter CFPB,
CONSUMER RESPONSE].
63. See CFPB, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 56, at 15.
64. See CFPB, CONSUMER RESPONSE, supra note 62.
65. See CFPB, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 56, at 15.
66. Scott Pluta, Now Accepting Money Transfer Complaints, CONSUMER FIN.
PROTECTION BUREAU (Apr. 4, 2013), www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/now-acceptingmoney-transfer-complaints/.
67. CFPB, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 56, at 19.
68. The plurality of complaints (46%) are submitted through the website; 34% are
referrals. Id. at 20.
69. Disclosure of Certain Credit Card Complaint Data, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,558,
37,561 (June 22, 2012).
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However, the CFPB does not independently verify whether the
complaint has merit, which has been another point of contention with
financial services companies.70 Screened complaints are then forwarded
to the appropriate company (or the appropriate regulatory agency),71 and
the company must respond to the complaint within 15 days to be
considered “timely.”72 If a company requires more time to respond to
the complaint, it could indicate to the CFPB that resolution is “in
progress” but must provide a final response within 60 days.73 Company
responses fall into one of six categories: company reported closed with
explanation; company reported closed with monetary relief; company
reported closed with non-monetary relief; company reviewing company
provided administrative response; and company reported closed
(without relief or explanation).74 Once the CFPB receives the
company’s response, consumers have 30 days to provide feedback,
including an opportunity to dispute the company’s response.75
Each of these steps, including the company’s timeliness, its
response, and whether the consumer disputed the complaint, is recorded
in the public Consumer Complaint Database, along with the consumer’s
ZIP code, the date of submission, and the type of complaint (i.e., the
product or service and the specific kind of issue to which the complaint
relates).76 The Database only includes complaints about companies
subject to CFPB jurisdiction, including: “banks, thrifts, and credit
unions with over $10 billion in assets, and their affiliates, as well as
certain nonbank consumer financial service providers, such as mortgage
lenders, brokers and servicers; private education lenders; payday
lenders; and larger participants of the consumer reporting and debt
70.
71.

CFPB, DISCLOSURE OF CONSUMER COMPLAINT DATA, supra note 58.
According to the Bureau, 11% of complaints in 2012 were referred to other
regulatory agencies. CFPB, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 56, at 32 n.15.
72. Id. at 17 n.11.
73. Id.
74. Prior to June 1, 2012, companies could also respond with “full resolution
provided,” “partial resolution provided,” and “closed with relief,” but those categories
were subsumed into “closed with monetary relief.” Similarly, “no resolution provided”
and “closed without relief” were incorporated into “closed with explanation.”
According to the CFPB, the majority of 2012 complaints were reported closed with
explanation (65%); only 2% were reported closed without relief or explanation. Id. at
32–34.
75. Id. at 35.
76. See Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaintdatabase/technical-documentation/
(last
visited Oct. 22, 2013).
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collection markets.”77 The CFPB has defined “larger” in the context of
consumer reporting companies as earning more than $7 million in
annual receipts;78 and debt collection agencies earning more than $10
million in annual receipts from consumer debt collection activities.79
III. THE DATA USED
The assembled statistics comparing companies is based on the
110,479 complaints and affiliated identifying information contained in
the CFPB’s Consumer Complaint Database.80 The analysis focuses on
comparing company-specific outcomes: the likelihood of each company
to receive a complaint relative to the number of products that the
company sells;81 the likelihood that each company’s consumers would
dispute the company’s response; and each company’s timeliness in
responding. The authors performed a series of regressions to assess
whether certain demographic information correlated with the total
number of complaints, the number of complaints that the consumers
dispute, and the timely response rate of companies per ZCTA or ZIP
code. Table 1 displays the summary statistics for the analysis, and the
Appendix provides the sources and descriptions of each of the variables
included.
Table 2 shows summary statistics for the various products and
issues in the CFPB Database. The largest product categories—credit
77.
78.

CFPB, Strategic Plan, supra note 8.
CFPB Now Taking Complaints on Credit Reporting, CONSUMER FIN.
PROTECTION BUREAU (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/
consumer-financial-protection-bureau-now-taking-complaints-on-credit-reporting/.
79. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Puts Companies On Notice About
Harmful Debt Collection Practices, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (July 10,
2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201307_cfpb_factsheet_debt-collection.pdf, at
1.
80. We lose a small number of observations (321) when trying to match ZIP codes
to our available ZIP code to ZCTA database, and another small number (72) when
merging with the census data. Companies with less than 10 observations were also
dropped. The CFPB reports data at the ZIP code level, but most census and similar
demographic data are at the ZCTA level.
81. The only product with readily available and trustworthy market share data is
home mortgages, via the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. Regulation C, now under the
auspices of the CFPB, requires lending institutions to publicly disclose loan data,
including the race of applicants and borrowers, all by ZIP code. See Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act, FFIEC, www.ffiec.gov/hmda/default.htm (last visited June 24, 2013).
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card and mortgage complaints—comprise more than half of the
Database’s complaints.82 Generally, a small number of complaint issues
are coded for each product except for credit card complaints, which falls
into one of 33 different categories.83 The analysis includes information
about the ZIP code level prevalence of various demographic factors to
the CFPB Complaint Database.84
In addition to some general
demographic variables of interest, including race and median income,
this study also concentrated on the groups to which the CFPB is required
to provide targeted assistance: military service members,85 Americans
over 62 years of age,86 and students.87 The expectation was that the
number of complaints from ZIP codes with high concentrations of
service members, senior citizens and college or graduate students,
holding all else equal, would be higher than average. Even if these
groups do not experience disproportionately higher incidences of unfair,
deceptive, and abusive acts or practices by financial services providers,
it was expected that the CFPB’s outreach to these groups would raise
awareness about the ability to complain to the Bureau and/or increase
the salience of the complaints process. However, since banks should
largely be aware of the CFPB’s differential focus on these specific
groups, it was also anticipated that the number of disputed or untimely
complaints would be lower for these populations (and by proxy, ZIP
codes with higher concentrations of them), at least if banks had
responded rationally to the threat of increased regulatory intervention by
the Bureau.
Some regression specifications also include a variable for the
availability of high-speed Internet access between 1999 and 2006. If
locations with longstanding access to Internet source providers
registered disproportionately more complaints, it could be suspected that
the CFPB was merely cherry-picking the Internet-savvy, as the plurality
of complaints the Bureau receives are web-based.88

82.
83.
84.
85.

For summary statistics, see Tables 1 and 2.
Id.
See Appendix.
Via an Office of Service Member Affairs. See 12 U.S.C. § 5493(e)(1) (2012).
Dodd-Frank specifically authorizes the Director of the CFPB to locate such an office
“near military bases, military treatment facilities, or other similar military facilities.” Id.
86. Via an Office of Financial Protection for Older Americans. See 12 U.S.C. §
5493(g)(1).
87. Via the Private Education Loan Ombudsman. See 12 U.S.C. § 5535(a) (2012).
88. See supra note 68.
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One of the chief complaints that financial service providers lodged
when the CFPB announced plans to publicize its complaint Database
was the lack of scale to normalize the data.89 For example, a bank with
100,000 open accounts and 500 complaints might look worse than a
bank with 1,000 accounts outstanding and 200 complaints, at least if
consumers were not informed of each bank’s respective size.
Unfortunately, the CFPB does not yet offer a way to normalize the
number of complaints in the Database, and the only independently
verifiable market share data that was accessible for this data was for
mortgage complaints. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HMDA”)
requires certain financial institutions to report home lending activity,
which provides a baseline for the number of mortgages that each bank
creates.90 However, because of the lagging releases of HMDA data, the
data is based on the flow of home mortgages that particular companies
issued as a proxy for the stock of those companies’ 2013 market share of
outstanding mortgages.
The proxy regarding outstanding home mortgages could fail for
several reasons, including the delay between HMDA data collection and
release, and the mismatch between mortgage originators and servicers.
The time lag itself is not of major concern because many of the
mortgage issue complaints in 2012-2013 likely dated to approvals in
years past.91 A potentially more significant concern is that mortgage
originators and servicers are not always identical. For example, if Bank
of America consistently sells all of its mortgages to Citibank, our
calculation would overstate Bank of America’s number of complaints
per mortgage because it would not account for the complaints filed once
Citibank owned the mortgages. Without further disclosures from
financial service providers, the HMDA data should at least begin to

89. See, e.g., Letter from Nessa Feddis, Vice President and Senior Counsel, Ctr. for
Regulatory Compliance, to Monica Jackson 3 (July 19, 2012), available at
http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/files/2012/07/clConsumercomplaintdata2012July.pdf
[hereinafter Feddis Letter].
90. See Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, FFEIC (Sept. 23, 2013),
http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/hmdaproducts.htm.
91. As well, none of the companies listed in Table 4 below were subject to a major
merger between 2011 and 2013. See, e.g., Alan Kline, Bank Population Shrinks Rapidly
Amid Lull in Startups, AM. BANKER (Sept. 5, 2013), available at
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_172/bank-population-shrinks-rapidlyamid-lull-in-startups-1061817-1.html.
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provide a baseline to assess the likelihood that a recent mortgage will
give rise to a consumer complaint.
There are a few more limitations to the data and its results. For
example, financial service providers have complained that the data is not
representative because they merely measured the number of
complainants, not the number of actual unfair or deceptive practices.92
For example, if Bank of America customers were identifiably different
in some way from Citibank customers such that the former were more
likely to complain than the latter, there might be a significant difference
in the number of complaints but not in the incidence of unfair practices.
Additionally, the Database does not differentiate between “major” and
“minor” complaints.93 As a result, even if two banks were to have the
same number of complaints relative to number of mortgages
outstanding, for instance, one bank might still be engaging in worse
practices, but that distinction would not be apparent from the CFPB
data. Furthermore, because the CFPB’s regulatory authority over banks
is limited to those with over $10 billion in assets, complaints about
smaller banks are excluded from the Database, which might distort
consumer perception of the relative performance of smaller and bigger
companies. Finally, companies were also concerned that consumer
complaints entered into the Database might not be meritorious because
the CFPB does not verify the accuracy of each complaint, thereby
skewing the perception of each company’s performance.94
These issues, while presumably of concern to the CFPB, are not
particularly problematic for our analysis. First, as discussed above, the
Bureau does verify that the consumer has a business relationship with
the company in question, so only actual disgruntled customers can
submit complaints.95 More importantly, the analysis herein on company
variation does not implicate most of the aforementioned concerns. For
example, it is unlikely that the customers of any one company would be
more or less inclined to concoct frivolous claims, especially given the
size and national scale of the companies under review, which allow for
randomized, representative data. This is aside from the unlikelihood
that most complainants would even dispute a company’s response to a
truly frivolous complaint, given the additional time that such disputes
92.
93.
94.
95.

See Feddis Letter, supra note 89.
See id.
Id.
See Disclosure of Certain Credit Card Complaint Data, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,558,
37,561 (June 22, 2012).
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require. Moreover, even if all of the complaints against a particular
company were frivolous or “minor,” it does not excuse that company
from providing timely responses. If anything, the more frivolous or
minor the complaint, the easier it should be for the company to respond
quickly.
IV. THE RESULTS
A. THE COMPANY-SPECIFIC RESULTS
Table 3 lists the 27 companies with a significantly higher
proportion of untimely responses than average, at the 10% significance
level. Among these, the least timely company was the Prudent Law
Group, a loan modification specialist, which responded late to 92% of
its 12 complaints. Among the larger institutions, Bank of America,
Citibank, and PNC Bank were significantly less timely than average,
with untimely response rates of 6%, 4%, and 5%, respectively.
Table 4 analogously reports the list of companies with a statistically
higher than average proportion of disputed company responses, ranked
by the proportion disputed.96 While the sample size for most companies
is relatively small, Table 4 shows that consumers disputed significantly
more responses from 17 companies, including some of the largest banks
in the U.S., including Wells Fargo (24% disputed) and Bank of America
(22% disputed).97 Interestingly, the companies with the largest
percentage of disputed responses were BMW Financial Services (53%
disputed) and Charles Schwab Bank (40% disputed).98 However, these
rates might represent higher consumer expectations associated with the
companies’ positions at the upper end of the consumer finance market.
In Table 5, the HMDA data described above was used to assess the
number of mortgage complaints per mortgage that originated for the
banks with the largest number of CFPB records.
Given the
methodology, it would be inaccurate to say that, for example, 25% of
96. All consumer complainants have the opportunity to dispute the company’s
response within 30 days of receiving it. See CFPB, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
56, at 35. From Table 1, the mean number of disputed responses across all categories
of products and services was 21%, which is identical to the CFPB’s reported percentage
in October 2012. See CFPB, CONSUMER RESPONSE, supra note 62, at 4.
97. See Table 4.
98. Albeit these are the two smallest sample sizes, consisting of 19 and 20
observations, respectively, in the data set.
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OneWest Bank’s outstanding mortgages generated complaints, as some
of the 1,113 mortgage complaints could have been lodged for products
sold in multiple years past and not in 2011 alone. However, the number
of mortgages that originated in 2011 provides some basis for
normalizing the number of complaints received, thus serving as a
benchmark for comparing the banks. By this metric, OneWest performs
far worse than any other bank.99 Among the banks with over one
million mortgages that originated in 2011, Bank of America received the
highest percentage of complaints.100
B. RESULTS BASED ON ZIP CODE DEMOGRAPHICS, PRODUCTS, AND
SPECIFIC ISSUES
The remainder of the analysis is not company-specific, and instead
focuses on the demographic information from ZIP codes with reported
complaints and the products and specific issues about which consumers
complained. Table 6 displays the results for a regression of the log of
the total number of mortgage complaints over the number of households
with a mortgage for ZCTAs with at least one registered complaint in the
Database. Our model for Table 6 is
CPMit = β0 + β1demographicsit + β2quarterit + β3stateit +
β4companyit + εit,
where CPMit is the log of mortgage complaints per 2011 mortgage
originations at the ZIP code level, and demographicsit is a vector of
Quarter-fixed effects control for
demographic characteristics.101
99. However, our ranking measure of complaints per mortgages originated in 2011
will overstate the tendency for the stock of a company’s outstanding mortgages to
generate complaints if that company’s market share of 2011 originations was lower
than its origination market share in the past. We note that OneWest was predominantly
formed with the then bankrupt IndyMac’s assets in 2009, and that Bank of America
purchased Countrywide (a massive mortgage lender) in 2008.
100. See Table 5.
101. Fixed effects are {0,1} variables that are included to control for unobserved
heterogeneity (an unobserved quantity that could influence the relationship between the
dependent and independent variables). For example, if a certain demographic
characteristics were (1) not included as controls in the regression, (2) constant over time
at the state level, and (3) influenced the relationship between mortgage complaints and
an included variable, the coefficient on the included variable would be biased in the
regression. State fixed effects control for this possibility. See Benjamin A. Lindy, The
Impact of Teacher Collective Bargaining Laws on Student Achievement: Evidence from
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heterogeneity in complaints across time while state-fixed effects control
for heterogeneity at the state level. In the full specification, companyfixed effects are included to control for idiosyncratic company effects.
Note that our reduced-form model cannot prove causality: for
example, if ZIP codes with higher proportions of senior citizens have
more complaints per mortgage, we cannot determine if mortgage
companies are treating older borrowers worse than younger ones, or if
senior citizens are just more likely to complain to the CFPB. However,
even in the absence of causal evidence, the results at least suggest that
mortgage lenders might need to show increased care toward certain
populations.
Table 6 shows that even after controlling for quarter-, state-, and
company-fixed effects, the complaint rates are statistically higher in ZIP
codes with higher concentrations of African-Americans, Hispanics, and
seniors.102 For the most controlled specifications, the complaint rate
falls statistically as the median income of a ZIP code rises but increases
with the median income of African-American or Hispanic residents.
However, areas with higher concentrations of active duty military are
significantly more likely to complain only in the specifications that do
not control for the number of Internet service providers (“ISPs”), rural
concentration, and foreclosure risk score.
Areas with better-educated populations (i.e., high school and
college graduates) are significantly more likely to report mortgage
complaints. ZCTAs with high employment rates appear to also have
larger numbers of complaints, but the level of significance drops once
the state- and company-fixed effects are added.
A somewhat surprising result is in the final column specification,
which shows a negative and statistically significant coefficient estimated
for a ZIP code’s number of ISPs. These authors predicted that
borrowers with faster Internet access would be able to file complaints
online at a higher rate than borrowers without such access. Finally, ZIP
codes with a higher foreclosure risk score had statistically lower
complaints per mortgage. This foreclosure finding is potentially
troubling for the CFPB and a potential cause of action for consumer
advocates because it suggests that areas with homes at the greatest risk

A New Mexico Natural Experiment, 120 YALE L.J. 1130, 1147 (2011) (explaining fixed
effects).
102. The census data track senior citizens over the age of 65 rather than 62.
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of foreclosure are not sufficiently availing themselves of the CFPB’s
complaint system.
Next, Table 7 provides results pertaining to whether a complaint
was resolved in a timely manner across company and product. Here, the
individual level data is coded as a 0 for an undisputed complaint and a 1
for a disputed complaint, and a logit regression ran the individual data.
The specification of fixed effects is the same as in Table 6 but includes
issue-fixed effects, enabled by the use of individual data. The only
independent variable that produced significant results is college
enrollment: ZCTAs with higher levels of college students were
significantly more likely to report untimely responses from companies.
Because students are a particular focus of the CFPB, this result is both
unexpected and troubling. Higher proportions of Blacks and Hispanics
were positively correlated with untimeliness of the company’s response,
albeit not significantly.
Table 7 also disaggregates timeliness by product and by specific
complaint within each product type. The timeliness of corporate
responses for each product listed in the table is compared to mortgages,
the omitted category. Thus, companies responding to bank account or
service and credit card complaints were significantly more likely to be
timely in their response than mortgage companies. Companies were
also more likely to be timely in responding to student loan complaints
although the level of significance declines once company-fixed effects
are included.
Similarly, the regressions for issues within each product type
compare the timeliness of response to the largest issue (determined by
the number of complaints registered with the CFPB) in each category.103
According to the analysis, credit card companies seem to discriminate
the most based on issue type.104 Complaints about the Annual
Percentage Rate (“APR”) or interest rate and the payoff process were
significantly more likely to receive a timely response while complaints
about credit card or debt protection, identity theft/fraud/embezzlement,
and sale of account were significantly less likely to receive a timely
response, relative to credit card billing disputes.105 Although it seems

103.
104.

See infra Table 7.
See id. (showing the coefficients for product category); see also infra Table 9
(showing the coefficients for a subset of the issues within those product categories).
Due to space restrictions, the issue coefficients found in Table 9 are from the
specification in the final column of Table 7.
105. See infra Table 9.
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counterintuitive that companies would not respond in a timely fashion to
fraud claims in particular, as they can pose a more endemic and
expensive problem for companies if not quickly resolved, it is possible
that only certain types of complaints would be routed through the CFPB
rather than the credit card seller directly. Regardless, the divergence in
timeliness among these products suggests that at least credit card
companies are selective in prioritizing their timely responses to
customer complaints.
Table 8 contains an analogous logit regression of whether a
complaint was disputed on the same demographic factors described
above. These results must be taken with an extra degree of caution, as
consumers may complain regardless of whether the company responded
in a satisfactory manner. We found that areas with more senior citizens
were more likely to dispute company responses. One hypothesis is that
many individuals in that age bracket are retirees, and therefore, have
more time to pursue complaints. It also might suggest that the CFPB’s
Office of Older Americans may need to make a more concerted effort to
work with companies before the dispute stage. Among the CFPB’s
other target groups, higher levels of military employment in a ZIP code
positively correlate with the number of disputes in that area, but not
significantly so. At the same time, college enrollment is negatively
correlated with the number of disputes but not significantly. Similarly,
higher numbers of college graduates are more likely to dispute
complaints, albeit with weaker significance once accounting for
additional variables and multiple fixed effects. More rural areas are also
significantly more likely to dispute responses, although the coefficients
are not large. As in Table 6, the Foreclosure Risk Score is negatively
correlated with the number of disputes, although only at a modest level
of significance.
Table 8 displays the number of responses disputed among each
product category. Again, relative to mortgages, consumers were
significantly less likely to dispute company responses to complaints
about bank account or service, credit card, and student loan products.
Among product issues, consumers were significantly less likely to
dispute company responses to complaints about bank account funds
being too low, credit card advertising and marketing, credit card billing
statements and related fees, and credit monitoring or identity protection
from credit reporting agencies. However, consumers were significantly
more likely to dispute credit card company responses about bankruptcy,
cash advances, collection debt disputes, credit card or debt protection, a
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change in credit line or credit reporting, and credit reporting agency
responses about company investigations and improper use of the credit
report. Although these results do not suggest one clear, consistent
pattern, one possible explanation is that consumers are less satisfied
with company responses when dealing with more bureaucratic or
complex processes (i.e., bankruptcy or credit reporting) than with issues
that are more individualized, simplistic, and easily resolved (i.e., fee
assessments).
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Without commenting specifically on the consumer finance
industry’s objections to the level of public disclosure, the CFPB’s
Consumer Complaint Database is unquestionably a rich source of
data.106 The total number of complaints and whether the proposed
company response was timely and disputed provide a snapshot of how
both the CFPB and the companies that it regulates are performing. The
analysis herein incorporates a number of dimensions to determine who
is complaining and how companies are responding.107 The results
suggest that the CFPB might need to conduct more outreach in areas
where homeowners have the highest risk of foreclosure given the lower
number of complaints in ZIP codes with higher foreclosure risk scores,
contrary to expectations about who would avail themselves of the
complaint process (i.e., those facing foreclosure).108 Furthermore, the
CFPB might need to assert more pressure on companies serving older
Americans, as areas with more seniors were significantly more likely to
dispute company resolutions.109
Likewise, the CFPB’s Private Education Loan Ombudsman should
be concerned that company responses were significantly more likely to
be untimely in areas with higher concentrations of students.110 The
analysis also suggests that some of the biggest companies in the
consumer finance industry have yet to focus on the potential
consequences—both regulatory and public relations—for inadequately
responding to complaints lodged with the CFPB.111 Bank of America,
Citibank, PNC, and OneWest Bank were significantly more like likely
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See Cordray, Field Hearing Prepared Remarks, supra note 4.
See supra Part IV; see also infra Tables 3–10 (analyzing statistical results).
See supra Part IV; infra Table 6.
See infra Table 8.
See infra Table 7.
See infra Table 3.
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than the average bank to respond in an untimely manner.112 Moreover,
consumers of several major national financial institutions, including
Wells Fargo and Bank of America, were significantly more likely to
dispute the company’s response to their complaints.113 It should also be
worrisome to executives at, and potential customers of, OneWest Bank,
HSBC, Nationstar Mortgage, and Bank of America, that the volume of
mortgage complaints that those companies received out of the number of
mortgages that they sold were disproportionately larger compared to that
of other large companies.114 The divergent rates of timeliness in
responding to complaints based on the product and issue also suggest
that the CFPB needs to stress the importance of timely responses to all
complaints, not just those that a company deems to be higher
priorities.115 In addition, to the extent that responses from mortgage
companies and any financial institution regarding more complex
products or issues result in more consumer disputes, the CFPB may wish
to work with companies and consumers at the initial complaint stage to
preempt any problems that result from disputed responses.
CONCLUSION
Our analysis demonstrates that the CFPB’s decision to disclose the
details about the complaints that it receives indeed serves the Bureau’s
goal of enabling researchers to “analyze, augment, and build” on the
Consumer Complaint Database.116 The results of the study reveal
significant differences among financial services providers on how timely
they are in responding to complaints, and the extent to which consumers
dispute those responses. Moreover, the underlying products being
complained about and the issues consumers had with those products
drove differences in company response time and percentage of disputes.
Likewise, the demographics of a complainant’s ZIP code also drove
significant difference in these key company variables. Given the
CFPB’s power to regulate financial services providers, and its stated
reliance on the Consumer Complaint Database as a key source of
information about the marketplace, companies should heed these results

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See id.
See infra Table 4.
See infra Table 5.
See infra Tables 2 and 9.
See Cordray, Field Hearing Prepared Remarks, supra note 4.
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and strive to improve their response processes for all consumers.
Additionally, the CFPB should work to ensure that all consumers know
about and have access to the complaint system, at the very least as a
means of strengthening the feedback loop.
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APPENDIX: VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS
















Disputed: The complaints disputed by consumers within the
CFPB’s 30-day window once the company’s response is
received, as reported in the Consumer Complaint Database
Not Timely: The complaints to which the company did not
respond within the CFPB’s 15-day window once the consumer
complaint was transmitted, as reported in the Consumer
Complaint Database
Proportion Black: By ZCTA, the respondents who reported
“Black” or “African-American” as their only race, as reported in
the 2007-2011 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates
Proportion Hispanic: By ZCTA, the respondents who reported
Hispanic or Latino origin (regardless of race), as reported in the
2007-2011 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates
Median Income (Black): By ZCTA, the household median
income in the past 12 months (in 2011 inflation-adjusted dollars)
as reported in the 2007-2011 American Community Survey 5Year Estimates, for respondents reporting one race: Black or
African American
Median Income (Hispanic): By ZCTA, the household median
income in the past 12 months (in 2011 inflation-adjusted dollars)
as reported in the 2007-2011 American Community Survey 5Year Estimates, for respondents reporting Hispanic or Latino
origin
Median Income (All): By ZCTA, the household median income
in the past 12 months (in 2011 inflation-adjusted dollars) as
reported in the 2007-2011 American Community Survey 5-Year
Estimates by all respondents
Seniors: By ZCTA, the percent of the total population aged 65
and older, as reported in the 2007-2011 American Community
Survey 5-Year Estimates
Military Employment: By ZCTA, employment status reported
as in labor force: Armed Forces, as reported in the 2007-2011
American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates
College Enrollment: By ZCTA, the percent of the total
population enrolled in college or graduate school, as reported in
the 2007-2011 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates
High School Graduates: By ZCTA, the percentage of those
who reporting being both 25 years or older and a high school

2014]









SKELETONS IN THE DATABASE

371

graduate (or high school equivalent) out of the ZCTA’s total
population, as reported in the 2007-2011 American Community
Survey 5-Year Estimates
College Graduates: By ZCTA, the percentage of those who
reported being 25 years or older and having a bachelor’s degree
out of the ZCTA’s total population, as reported in the 2007-2011
American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates
Unemployment Rate: By ZCTA, the estimated unemployment
rate for those 16 years of age or older, as reported in the 20072011 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates
Number ISPs: The number of high-speed ISPs per ZIP code in
2006, as reported by the FCC
Rural (RUCA Score): The score of the rural or urban
concentration within a ZIP code, whereby a score of 1 represents
a “metropolitan area core: primary flow within an urbanized
area,” and a score of 10 represents “a rural area: primary flow to
a tract outside an urbanized area or urban cluster.”117
Foreclosure Risk Score: The foreclosure “risk score” at the ZIP
code level, based on measures of subprime lending, foreclosures,
delinquency, and vacancies, as calculated by the Local
Initiatives Support Corporation (“LISC”), whereby the ZIP
codes are scored in relative terms, such that the highest-risk area
within each state receives a score of 100, and each other ZIP
code is assigned a score based on its relative risk profile (i.e., a
ZIP code with half of the risk of the highest-risk area would
receive a score of 50).118

117. The Census Bureau created the Rural Urban Community Areas (RUCA)
scores, which are available at the Rural Health Research Center’s website. See RUCA
Data, RURAL HEALTH RES. CENTER, depts.washington.edu/uwruca/ruca-data.php (last
visited Feb. 26, 2014).
118. For more information and raw scores, see LISC Foreclosure Risk Scores Data,
March 2013, FORECLOSURE-RESPONSE.ORG (July 2013), www.foreclosureresponse.org/maps_and_data/lisc_data.html.
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable

Level

Obs

Mean

Std.
Dev

Min

Max

Not Timely

Individual

110,479

0.03

0.16

0

1

Disputed

Individual

110,479

0.21

0.41

0

1

Complaints per
Mortgage*

ZCTA

7,865

0.00

0.01

0

0.44

Proportion Black

ZCTA

15,493

0.10

0.17

0

1.00

Proportion
Hispanic

ZCTA

15,493

0.10

0.17

0

1.00

Median Income
(Black)

ZCTA

10,779

4.81

3.16

0.30

24.78

Median Income
(Hispanic)

ZCTA

12,391

5.24

3.06

0.35

24.69

Median Income
(All)

ZCTA

15,433

5.76

2.42

0.86

24.22

Proportion
Seniors

ZCTA

15,493

0.18

0.07

0

1.00

Proportion
Military
Employment

ZCTA

15,480

0.01

0.05

0

0.99

Proportion
College

ZCTA

15,493

0.08

0.07

0

1.03

High School

ZCTA

15,493

0.19

0.08

0

1.00

College Graduate

ZCTA

15,493

0.20

0.13

0

1.00

Unemployment
Rate

ZCTA

15,480

0.09

0.05

0

0.77

ISP

ZIP

15,094

8.77

3.30

0

21

RUCA

ZIP

16,759

2.78

2.90

1

10.60

Foreclosure Risk
Score

ZIP

14,886

0.09

0.14

0

1.00



For ZCTAs with at least one mortgage complaint and not more
mortgage complaints than households with mortgages listed by
the census.
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TABLE 2: PRODUCT TYPES AND ISSUES
Bank Account or Service
Issue
Account opening, closing, or management
Deposits and withdrawals
Making/receiving payments, sending
money
Problems caused by my funds being low
Using a debit or ATM card
Total119

Complaints Percentage
7,026
40.58
4,904
28.32
1,482
2,859
1,043
17,314

8.56
16.51
6.02
100

Complaints
174
227
1,445
624
61
124
305
2,960

Percentage
5.88
7.67
48.82
21.08
2.06
4.19
10.30
100

Consumer Loan
Issue
Account terms and changes
Managing the line of credit
Managing the loan or lease
Problems when you are unable to pay
Shopping for a line of credit
Shopping for a loan or lease
Taking out the loan or lease
Total
Credit Reporting
Issue
Credit monitoring or identity protection
Credit reporting company’s investigation
Improper use of my credit report
Incorrect information on credit report
Unable to get credit report/credit score
Total

Complaints
209
867
349
3,907
717
6,049

Percentage
3.46
14.33
5.77
64.59
11.85
100

119.
This and the totals in the following tables equal exactly 100% when
accounting for rounding error from the use of two digits.
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Credit Card
Issue
APR or interest rate
Advertising and marketing
Application processing delay
Arbitration
Balance transfer
Balance transfer fee
Bankruptcy
Billing disputes
Billing statement
Cash advance
Cash advance fee
Closing/Cancelling account
Collection debt dispute
Collection practices
Convenience checks
Credit card protection / Debt protection
Credit determination
Credit line increase/decrease
Credit reporting
Customer service / Customer relations
Delinquent account
Forbearance / Workout plans
Identity theft / Fraud / Embezzlement
Late fee
Other
Other fee
Overlimit fee
Payoff process
Privacy
Rewards
Sale of account
Transaction issue
Unsolicited issuance of credit card
Total

Complaints
2,235
498
134
74
268
57
97
3,467
611
75
60
1,403
834
938
38
792
749
663
1,699
566
276
201
1,472
897
1,130
577
64
649
104
527
55
486
270
21,966

Percentage
10.17
2.27
0.61
0.34
1.22
0.26
0.44
15.78
2.78
0.34
0.27
6.39
3.80
4.27
0.17
3.61
3.41
3.02
7.73
2.58
1.26
0.92
6.70
4.08
5.14
2.63
0.29
2.95
0.47
2.40
0.25
2.21
1.23
100
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Money Transfers
Issue
Fraud or scam
Incorrect/missing disclosures or info
Money was not available when promised
Other service issues
Other transaction issues
Wrong amount charged or received
Total

Complaints
6
1
9
2
15
2
35

Percentage
17.14
2.86
25.71
5.71
42.86
5.71
100

Complaints
3,898
1,254
34,785

Percentage
6.68
2.15
59.58

14,745

25.26

1,801
1,898
58,381

3.08
3.25
100

Complaints
140
1,125
2,509
3,774

Percentage
3.71
29.81
66.48
100

Mortgage
Issue
Application, originator, mortgage broke
Credit decision / Underwriting
Loan modification, collection,
foreclosure
Loan servicing, payments, escrow
account
Other
Settlement process and costs
Total
Student Loan
Issue
Getting a loan
Problems when you are unable to pay
Repaying your loan
Total
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TABLE 3: COMPANY-SPECIFIC PROPORTION OF COMPLAINTS WITH
UNTIMELY COMPANY RESPONSES
Company
Prudent Law Group
Mercedes-Benz Financial
Services
Statebridge Company
Vantium Capital
Quantum Servicing Company
UMB Bank
BancorpSouth Bank
Residential Credit Solutions
Regions
Mortgage Investors
Corporation
Amerisave
Franklin Credit Management
USAA Savings
Morgan Stanley
Bayview Loan Servicing,
LLC
First Niagara Bank
People’s United Bank
OneWest Bank
MetLife Bank

Observations Percent
P-Value120
Untimely
12
0.92
0.00
12
0.58
0.00
51
21
18
33
19
115
647
41

0.31
0.24
0.22
0.21
0.21
0.18
0.17
0.17

0.00
0.04
0.07
0.01
0.07
0.00
0.00
0.02

70
27
491
65
183

0.16
0.15
0.14
0.14
0.08

0.00
0.09
0.00
0.01
0.01

170
90
1,147
179

0.08
0.08
0.07
0.07

0.01
0.07
0.00
0.02

120. Here, the null hypothesis is that the company’s proportion of untimely
responses is equal to the average proportion of untimely responses across all
companies. A low p-value indicates that the null hypothesis is statistically unlikely. A
p-value of 0.05 shows that there is a 1 in 20 chance of finding a value as or more
extreme as the observed value given the null hypothesis. A commonly used measure of
a “low” p-value is one lower than 0.10 or 0.05 (hence the references to 10%
significance and 5% significance). See generally DAVID MOORE, THE BASIC PRACTICE
OF STATISTICS 371–77 (2009) (explaining hypothesis testing).
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Carrington Mortgage
Loan Care
Bank of America
Nationstar Mortgage
M&T Bank
Comerica
PNC Bank
Citibank

148
95
23,493
1,819
636
145
2,030
7,519

0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.04

377
0.05
0.08
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.08
0.00
0.00

Notes: The companies shown have a significantly higher proportion of
untimely responses than average (defined at the 10% significance level).
The table is sorted by proportion of untimely responses. The final
column shows the p-value from a test of the difference in the proportion
of untimely responses from the average proportion of untimely
responses. Companies with fewer than 10 observations, after excluding
“In Progress” complaints, were not tested.
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TABLE 4: COMPANY-SPECIFIC PROPORTION OF COMPANY RESPONSES
DISPUTED BY CONSUMER
Company

Observations Percent PDisputed Value121

BMW Financial Services
Charles Schwab Bank
Cash Call
ChexSystems
Banco Popular de Puerto
Rico
Banco Popular North
America
Santander Consumer USA
State Farm Bank
Toyota Motor Credit
Corporation
Comerica
Navy FCU
The Huntington National
Bank
Amex
TD Bank
Wells Fargo
Ocwen
Bank of America

19
20
50
39
97

0.53
0.45
0.40
0.38
0.37

0.02
0.05
0.01
0.04
0.00

45

0.36

0.06

225
75
56

0.32
0.32
0.32

0.00
0.05
0.09

145
301
270

0.28
0.26
0.26

0.07
0.07
0.09

1,439
1,101
14,476
5,331
23,493

0.25
0.25
0.24
0.23
0.22

0.00
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.01

Notes: The companies shown have a significantly higher proportion of
disputed complaints than average (defined at the 10% significance
level). The table is sorted by proportion of disputed responses. The final
column shows the p-value from a test of the difference in the proportion
of disputed responses from the average proportion of disputed
responses. Companies with fewer than 10 observations, after excluding
“In Progress” complaints, were not tested.
121.

See supra note 120.
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TABLE 5: MORTGAGE COMPLAINTS PER MORTGAGE ORIGINATED,
LARGEST BANKS
Bank

OneWest
Bank
HSBC
Nationstar
Mortgage
Bank of
America
Citibank
JPMorgan
Chase
SunTrust
Bank
Wells Fargo

CFPB
Mortgage
Complaints*
1,113

Number of
2011 Mortgages
Originated**
4,507

Complaints per
Mortgage
Originated in 2011
0.247

1,402
1,817

15,720
33,639

0.089
0.054

17,502

1.00E+06

0.017

2,706
5,805

189,222
1.00E+06

0.014
0.006

1,038

184,056

0.006

9,499

2.10E+06

0.004

* Up to May 1, 2013
** 2011 HMDA data
Notes: The listed banks are those with the largest number of CFPB
records.
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TABLE 6: REGRESSIONS OF LOG OF MORTGAGE COMPLAINTS PER
MORTGAGE ORIGINATED ON DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS OF ZIP CODE
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Proportion
Hispanic

1.033***
(0.076)
0.745***
(0.162)

0.986***
(0.089)
0.867***
(0.178)

1.015***
(0.083)
0.346**
(0.143)

1.016***
(0.084)
0.364**
(0.146)

1.434***
(0.087)
0.696***
(0.150)

Median Income
(Blacks)

0.029***
(0.004)

0.031***
(0.004)

0.024***
(0.004)

0.024***
(0.004)

0.017***
(0.004)

Median Income
(Hispanics)

0.013***
(0.004)

0.013***
(0.004)

0.011***
(0.004)

0.011***
(0.004)

0.004
(0.004)

Median Income
(All)

0.008
(0.007)

-0.002
(0.011)

-0.056***
(0.012)

-0.056***
(0.013)

-0.032***
(0.012)

Seniors
(Proportion age
65+)

1.316***
(0.260)

1.052***
(0.260)

1.069***
(0.264)

0.810***
(0.232)

Military
Employment

3.790***
(0.602)

3.705***
(0.656)

3.734***
(0.661)

1.293
(0.858)

College
Enrollment

0.111
(0.303)

0.080
(0.300)

0.091
(0.303)

0.246
(0.259)

High School
Graduates

0.040
(0.458)

1.520***
(0.402)

1.561***
(0.405)

1.623***
(0.335)

College Graduates

0.818***
(0.284)

1.682***
(0.242)

1.708***
(0.245)

1.792***
(0.230)

Unemployment
Rate

1.833***
(0.449)

0.831*
(0.464)

0.881*
(0.467)

0.459
(0.388)

Proportion Black

Number ISPs

-0.036***
(0.005)
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Rural (RUCA
score)

0.024***
(0.004)

Foreclosure Risk
Score

-0.743***
(0.088)

Quarter Fixed
Effects
State Fixed Effects
Company Fixed
Effects

Y

Observations
R-squared

7863
0.187

Y

7863
0.213

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

7863
0.322

7863
0.331

7580
0.339

Notes: The dependent variable is the log of total number of mortgage
complaints over number of households with a mortgage (as reported by
the 2007-2011 American Community Survey Estimates) for ZCTAs
with at least one complaint. Dummies are included in all regressions for
whether the income data for Blacks and Hispanics were available.
Standard errors are clustered by state and company. “In progress”
responses, companies with less than 1 observations, and complaints
lacking a state were excluded. ISP, RUA score, and foreclosure risk
score are averaged at the ZCTA level. * denotes significance at the 10%
level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes
significance at the 1% level.
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TABLE 7: LOGIT REGRESSIONS OF UNTIMELY RESPONSES ON ZIP
CODE DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Proportion Black

0.006
(0.172)

0.045
(0.204)

0.047
(0.143)

0.046
(0.142)

0.149
(0.169)

Proportion
Hispanic

-0.042
(0.331)

0.055
(0.288)

0.194
(0.161)

0.279
(0.178)

0.236
(0.188)

Median Income
(Blacks)

0.011
(0.012)

0.009
(0.012)

0.009
(0.010)

0.006
(0.010)

0.003
(0.010)

Median Income
(Hispanics)

0.002
(0.011)

0.000
(0.011)

-0.000
(0.011)

-0.001
(0.012)

-0.000
(0.012)

Median Income
(All)

-0.011
(0.017)

0.003
(0.023)

0.008
(0.018)

0.019
(0.019)

0.028
(0.021)

Seniors
(Proportion age
65+)

0.476
(0.888)

0.565
(0.452)

0.636
(0.430)

0.580
(0.443)

Military
Employment

0.211
(0.818)

0.390
(0.739)

0.012
(0.852)

-0.701
(1.149)

College
Enrollment

1.265**
(0.582)

1.333***
(0.409)

1.037**
(0.428)

1.028**
(0.462)

High School
Graduates

1.202
(1.640)

1.532**
(0.703)

1.416**
(0.714)

1.374*
(0.753)

College
Graduates

0.085
(0.717)

0.366
(0.409)

0.313
(0.422)

-0.017
(0.488)

Unemployment
Rate

-0.901
(1.233)

-0.647
(0.916)

-0.217
(0.951)

-0.597
(1.028)
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Number ISPs

0.013
(0.009)

Rural (RUCA
score)

0.005
(0.015)

Foreclosure Risk
Score

-0.134
(0.150)

PRODUCT
Bank account or
service

-0.595***
(0.139)

-0.596***
(0.137)

-0.583***
(0.136)

-0.483***
(0.109)

-0.526***
(0.117)

Consumer loan

-0.326*
(0.197)

-0.330*
(0.196)

-0.322*
(0.191)

0.262
(0.231)

0.280
(0.233)

Credit card

-0.718***
(0.143)

-0.722***
(0.142)

-0.709***
(0.134)

-0.303**
(0.144)

-0.345**
(0.152)

Credit reporting

-2.977***
(0.563)

-2.976***
(0.563)

-2.985***
(0.561)

0.376
(0.757)

0.502
(0.768)

Student loan

-1.565***
(0.278)

-1.575***
(0.277)

-1.575***
(0.273)

-0.058
(0.220)

-0.095
(0.231)

Product / Issue
Interactions
Quarter Fixed
Effects
State Fixed
Effects
Company Fixed
Effects
Observations

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

95680

91719

107270

107270

107270

Notes: The dependent variable is a 0-1 dummy for whether a complaint
was resolved in an untimely fashion. Standard errors are clustered by
state and company. As some ZIP codes have no Black or Hispanic
residents, dummies are included in all regressions for whether income
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data for blacks and Hispanics were available. “In progress” responses,
companies with less than 10 observations dropped, and complaints
lacking a state were excluded. For the product and issue fixed effects,
mortgages were the omitted product. See Table 9 for analysis of the
issue fixed effects. Significance levels are denoted by * for the 10%
level, ** for 5% level, and *** for the 1% level.
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TABLE 8: LOGIT REGRESSIONS OF DISPUTED RESPONSES ON ZIP CODE
DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Proportion Black

-0.140***
(0.043)

-0.078
(0.047)

-0.055
(0.056)

-0.068
(0.056)

-0.017
(0.066)

Proportion
Hispanic

-0.125**
(0.055)

-0.055
(0.063)

-0.056
(0.070)

-0.070
(0.071)

-0.062
(0.074)

Median Income
(Blacks)

-0.002
(0.004)

0.000
(0.004)

-0.001
(0.004)

-0.001
(0.004)

-0.001
(0.004)

Median Income
(Hispanics)

0.005
(0.004)

0.005
(0.004)

0.004
(0.004)

0.004
(0.004)

0.005
(0.004)

Median Income
(All)

0.014**
(0.006)

-0.001
(0.007)

-0.004
(0.008)

-0.005
(0.008)

-0.001
(0.008)

Seniors
(Proportion age
65+)

0.463***
(0.166)

0.787***
(0.191)

0.773***
(0.191)

0.690***
(0.209)

Military
Employment

0.259
(0.256)

0.225
(0.269)

0.191
(0.268)

0.714*
(0.395)

College
Enrollment

-0.302
(0.197)

-0.184
(0.215)

-0.180
(0.215)

-0.163
(0.223)

High School
Graduates

-0.439
(0.325)

0.196
(0.356)

0.203
(0.359)

0.101
(0.377)

College
Graduates

0.254
(0.181)

0.569***
(0.197)

0.557***
(0.198)

0.449**
(0.228)

Unemployment
Rate

0.064
(0.299)

0.150
(0.354)

0.180
(0.358)

0.223
(0.383)

Number ISPs

0.005
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Rural (RUCA
score)

(0.003)
0.016***
(0.006)

Foreclosure Risk
Score

-0.102*
(0.060)

PRODUCT
Bank account or
service

-0.065*
(0.036)

-0.075**
(0.036)

-0.082**
(0.036)

-0.089**
(0.038)

-0.092**
(0.037)

Consumer loan

-0.022
(0.068)

-0.023
(0.068)

-0.031
(0.068)

-0.123*
(0.073)

-0.108
(0.075)

Credit card

-0.223***
(0.050)

-0.231***
(0.050)

-0.236***
(0.049)

-0.195***
(0.048)

-0.182***
(0.049)

Credit reporting

-0.151***
(0.048)

-0.155***
(0.048)

-0.168***
(0.050)

-0.243
(0.204)

-0.261
(0.213)

Money transfers

0.517
(0.600)

0.507
(0.601)

0.492
(0.597)

0.595
(0.650)

0.586
(0.650)

Student loan

-0.257***
(0.057)

-0.260***
(0.057)

-0.269***
(0.055)

-0.125
(0.082)

-0.147*
(0.083)

Product / Issue
Interactions
Quarter Fixed
Effects
State Fixed
Effects
Company Fixed
Effects
Observations

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

108576

104090

108610

108610

108610

Notes: The dependent variable is a 0-1 dummy variable for whether an
individual complaint response was disputed. Standard errors clustered
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by state and company. As some ZIP codes have no Black or Hispanic
residents, dummies are included in all regressions for whether income
data for blacks and Hispanics were available. “In progress” responses,
companies with less than 10 observations, and complaints without a
state were excluded. For the product- and issue-fixed effects, mortgages
were the omitted product. See Table 10 for analysis of the issue fixed
effects. Significance levels are denoted by * for significance at the 10%
level, ** for significance at the 5% level, and *** for significance at the
1% level.
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TABLE 9: PRODUCT BY ISSUE INTERACTIONS FROM TABLE 7: THE FIVE
PRODUCT ISSUES MOST AND LEAST LIKELY TO BE UNTIMELY

PRODUCT: ISSUE

Coefficient
Predicted
Probability of from
Specification in
Being
Table 7
Untimely

Least Likely to be Untimely
Credit card: Payoff process

0.006

-1.397**
(0.578)

Credit reporting: Credit reporting
company’s investigation

0.006

1.592
(1.101)

Consumer loan: Taking out the loan
or lease

0.009

-1.540*
(0.792)

Credit card: APR or interest rate

0.012

-0.550**
(0.239)

Credit card: Credit determination

0.014

-0.424
(0.406)

Credit reporting: Improper use of
my credit report

0.042

0.954
(1.312)

Credit card: Identity theft / Fraud /
Embezzlement

0.044

0.625***
(0.197)

Credit card: Arbitration

0.048

0.862
(0.867)

Credit card: Sale of account

0.067

1.064*
(0.608)

Consumer loan: Shopping for a line
of credit

0.071

0.620
(0.610)

Most Likely to be Untimely
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Notes: This table reports additional coefficients from Table 7, Column
(5). The first column here lists the product and issue, the second column
shows the predicted probability of that issue being untimely from the
specification in the final column of Table 7, and the third column shows
the coefficient from the specification used in the final column of Table
7. The product/issue effects shown are those from Table 7 with the five
highest and lowest predicted probabilities of being untimely. For the
issues within each product, the analysis was conducted relative to the
most numerous type of issue for each product: these were (i) bank
account: account opening, closing, or management; (ii) consumer loan:
managing the loan or lease; (iii) credit reporting: incorrect information
on credit report; (iv) credit card: APR or interest rate; (v) money
transfer: other transaction issues; (vi) mortgage: loan modification,
collection, or foreclosure; (vii) student loan: repaying your loan.
Significance levels are denoted by * for significance at the 10% level,
** for significance at the 5% level, and *** for significance at the 1%
level.
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TABLE 10: PRODUCT BY ISSUE INTERACTIONS FROM TABLE 8: THE
FIVE PRODUCT ISSUES MOST AND LEAST LIKELY TO BE DISPUTED

PRODUCT: ISSUE

Predicted
Probability of
Being Disputed

Coefficient
from Table 8

Least Likely to be Disputed
Credit card: Late fee

0.115

-0.623***
(0.108)

Credit reporting: Credit monitoring
or identity protection

0.131

-0.380*
(0.204)

Credit card: Cash advance fee

0.132

-0.582
(0.395)

Credit card: Other fee

0.132

-0.514***
(0.154)

Credit card: Application processing
delay

0.134

-0.437
(0.274)

Consumer loan: Taking out the
loan or lease

0.261

0.192
(0.152)

Credit card: Arbitration

0.261

0.364
(0.284)

Credit card: Bankruptcy

0.302

0.579***
(0.217)

Credit card: Convenience checks

0.303

0.509
(0.393)

Credit card: Cash advance

0.328

0.723***
(0.270)

Most Likely to be Disputed
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Notes: This table reports additional coefficients from Table 8, Column
(5). The first column here lists the product and issue, the second column
shows the predicted probability of that issue being disputed from the
specification in the final column of Table 8, and the third column shows
the coefficient from the specification used in the final column of Table
8. The product/issue effects shown are those from Table 8 with the five
highest and lowest predicted probabilities of being disputed. For the
issues with each product, the following (most numerous type of issue for
each product) are omitted: (i) Bank account, Account opening, closing,
or management; (ii) Consumer loan: Managing the loan or lease; (iii)
Credit Reporting: Incorrect information on credit report; (iv) Credit
card: APR or interest rate; (v) Money transfer: Other transaction issues;
(vi) Mortgage: Loan modification, collection, foreclosure; (vii) Student
loan: Repaying your loan. Significance levels are denoted by * for
significance at the 10% level, ** for significance at the 5% level, and
*** for significance at the 1% level.

